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CLEAN POWER AND CHEVRON: SCORING THE FIGHT FOR
OBAMA’S CLIMATE CHANGE RULE
Leo Capoferri*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed the
Clean Power Plan (CPP) in June 2014, the response was mixed.
Proponents viewed it as a sensible and realistic means of reducing
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions produced by the energy sector.1
Many, however, were skeptical. Opponents of the rule argued that it
relied on a rarely used section of the Clean Air Act (CAA) to justify a
radical expansion of EPA authority.2 Several states and industry
participants have challenged both the proposed and final rule,3 and
the Supreme Court of the United States recently took the
unprecedented step of granting an immediate stay pending litigation.4
The stakes are high for the EPA and the Obama administration.
Facing recalcitrant opposition from a Republican-controlled Congress,
President Barack Obama promised executive action on climate
change5 and directed the EPA to limit CO2 emissions from existing
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2013, The College
of New Jersey. Special thanks to Professor Jordan Paradise for her guidance in writing
this Comment.
1
See Tomas Carbonell & Megan Ceronsky, Section 111(d) and the Clean Power Plan:
The Legal Foundation for Strong, Flexible, and Cost-Effective Carbon Pollution Standards for
Existing Power Plants, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 11086, 11090–91 (2014).
2
See Keith Goldberg, States, Industry Groups Launch Clean Power Plan Legal Fight,
LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2015, 2:13 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/718094/statescoal-groups-launch-clean-power-plan-legal-fight (according to West Virginia’s
Attorney General “[t]he Clean Power Plan is one of the most far-reaching energy
regulations in this nation’s history”).
3
See In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015); See also Alan
Neuhauser, Mess of Lawsuits Set to Challenge Clean Power Plan, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Oct. 23, 2015, 11:20 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/10/23/mess
-of-lawsuits-set-to-challenge-clean-power-plan.
4
See Order in Pending Case, WEST VIRGINIA V. E.P.A., 577 U.S. 15A773 (2016),
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/02/09/document_pm_03.pdf (last visited Jan.
3, 2017) (order granting stay).
5
See John M. Broder & Richard W. Stevenson, Speech Gives Climate Goals Center
Stage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/us/politics/
climate-change-prominent-in-obamas-inaugural-address.html?_r=0/.

653

CAPOFERRI(DO NOT DELETE)

654

2/16/2017 9:31 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:653

power plants.6 Given the remaining uncertainties and ongoing denial
of the scientific underpinnings of anthropogenic climate change,
executive action has the potential to alter the debate on mitigation
policies, forcing the opposition to challenge the extent of carbon
reduction rather than the policy itself.7 In addition, successful carbon
mitigation policies bolster the United States’ credibility on the
international stage as it continues to assume a leadership role in
transnational efforts to address global warming.8 Indeed, many
speculated whether the Supreme Court’s decision to stay the rule
would undermine the historic Paris Agreement on climate change.9
The CPP aims to reduce CO2 emissions from existing power plants
by thirty-two percent from their 2005 levels by 2030.10 To achieve this
goal, the CPP sets state-specific emissions standards tailored to each
state’s present energy mix.11 The EPA calculated these standards to
reflect the reductions that are achievable through the implementation
of three “building blocks,” each of which describes a particular method
of reducing CO2 emissions that the EPA has deemed feasible and costeffective.12 The building blocks provide for emissions reductions
through increased efficiency, or heat rate improvements, (building
block one) and the substitution of cleaner sources—natural gas and
renewables such as wind and solar—for coal (building blocks two and
three).13 Each state is responsible for devising and implementing a
plan for meeting the CPP’s emissions standards, subject to EPA
approval.14 If states fail to submit a plan, the EPA is authorized to
6

See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Announcing the
Clean Power Plan (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/08/03/remarks-president-announcing-clean-power-plan.
7
See Charlie Rose: President Obama’s Clean Power Plan with Gina McCarthy, Head of the
Environmental Protection Agency (PBS television broadcast Aug. 2, 2015),
http://www.charlierose.com/watch/60599780.
8
See id.
9
See Robinson Meyer, Did the Supreme Court Doom the Paris Climate Change Deal?,
THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2016/02/the-parts-of-obamas-climate-legacy-that-will-survive/462294/. The Paris
Agreement is a landmark deal that commits 195 nations to lowering CO2 emissions
levels. Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/climatechange-accord-paris.html. International diplomats viewed the CPP as a crucial factor
in the success of the negotiations. Id.
10
See Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/clean
powerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).
11
See id.
12
See id.
13
See id.
14
See id.
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substitute its own, which the states are obligated to implement.15
The CPP has broad implications for the energy sector. Due to the
nature of greenhouse gasses (GHGs), meaningful emissions
reductions cannot be achieved cost-effectively by measures
implemented at each facility.16 The EPA attempts to solve this problem
by identifying reductions that are achievable across the entire energy
grid, and not merely as a result of improvements to individual power
plants. Consequently, building blocks two and three are emissions
reduction measures that require actions “beyond the fenceline,” i.e.
outside the physical boundaries of an affected power plant. In order
to meet emissions rates set by the CPP, power plant owners and
operators will be forced to reduce generation from coal-fired facilities
and substitute generation from natural gas and renewable sources.17
The EPA estimates that the rule will reduce coal-fired generation by
nearly fifty percent from current levels.18 Therefore, the CPP will
restructure the nation’s energy supply, blurring the line between
pollution reduction and energy regulation.
In addition to the CPP’s negative implications for the coal
industry, the required emissions reductions are considerably more
stringent for some states compared with others, depending on the
extent of their reliance on coal-fired power.19 For these reasons, the
CPP has inspired vigorous opposition from states and industry
participants. Twenty-seven states and “countless” industry participants
are currently challenging the rule.20
Opponents of the CPP
consistently rely on two arguments.21 First, they argue that a drafting
15

See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2) (2012). See also id.
See Ann E. Carlson & Megan M Herzog, Symposium: Text In Context: The Fate of
Emergent Climate Regulation After UARG and EME Homer, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 23,
29 (2015).
17
See Eric Anthony DeBellis, In Defense of the Clean Power Plan: Why Greenhouse Gas
Regulation Under Clean Air Act Section 111(d) Need Not, and Should Not, Stop at the Fenceline,
42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 235, 254 (2015).
18
See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN POWER PLAN FINAL RULE
2–3, 3–24 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/
cpp-final-rule-ria.pdf.
19
See generally EPA, GOAL COMPUTATION TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT (2014),
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/20140602tsd-goalcomputation.pdf.
20
Robin Bravender et al., The Fate of the Obama Administration’s Signature Climate
Change Rule is in the Hands of the Courts, E & E PUB., http://www.eenews.net/interactive
/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal (last updated Feb. 19, 2016).
21
In addition, some opponents have argued that the CPP violates the 10th
Amendment, a claim which has been described as “spurious.” See Patrick Parenteau,
The Clean Power Plan Will Survive: Part 2, LAW360 (Sept. 29, 2015, 10:15 AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/704048/the-clean-power-plan-will-survive-part-2.
16

CAPOFERRI(DO NOT DELETE)

656

2/16/2017 9:31 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:653

error—caused when two separate versions of § 111(d), one drafted by
the House and one drafted by the Senate, were included in the 1990
amendments to the CAA—should be resolved to preclude regulation
of CO2 from existing power plants.22 Second, opponents argue that the
EPA lacks the authority to regulate beyond the fenceline.23 Because
the EPA relies on § 111(d) as the source of its authority for the CPP,
the first argument creates a threshold issue that a reviewing court will
likely be forced to resolve. The second argument is important because
it encapsulates a powerful narrative that the EPA’s critics have
employed, which describes the CPP as a sweeping and unprecedented
expansion of the agency’s authority.24 Taken together, both arguments
raise issues of first impression and will likely comprise the heart of the
legal challenge to the CPP.
Judicial review will hinge on the Supreme Court’s application of
the Chevron doctrine,25 as both issues involve the EPA’s interpretation
of the CAA. Under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, Inc., a court must defer to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of a statute if Congress’ intent is ambiguous.26 With
regard to the drafting error, opponents of the CPP argue that the
version of § 111(d) drafted by the House should govern and that it
unambiguously precludes the regulation of CO2 from power plants,27

Moreover, some opponents have focused on the EPA’s § 111(b) rule, which is a
statutory predicate of the CPP. See Patrick Parenteau, The Clean Power Plan Will Survive
Pt. 1, LAW360 (Sept. 28, 2015, 11:37 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/704046/
the-clean-power-plan-will-survive-part-1. This Comment ignores these arguments.
22
See Coal Industry Application for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action
Pending Judicial Review at 6, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2016) (No.
15A778) [hereinafter Coal Industry Stay Application]; Application by 29 States and State
Agencies for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action During Pendency of Petitions for
Review at 7–8, West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (No. 15A773) [hereinafter
States’ Stay Application]; Application of Utility and Allied Parties for Immediate Stay of
Final Agency Action Pending Appellate Review at 11, Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. EPA,
136 S. Ct. 998 (2016) (No. 15A776) [hereinafter Utilities’ Stay Application]; Final
Opening Brief of Petitioner at 15, In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (Nos. 14-1112, 14-1151) [hereinafter Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief]; Eric
Groten, Here Be Dragons: Legal Threats to EPA’s Proposed Existing Source Performance
Standards for Electric Generating Units, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10116, 10120–21 (2015).
23
See Application of Business Associations for Immediate Stay of Final Agency
Action Pending Appellate Review at 10–11, 16–17, West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000
(2016) (No. 15A773) [hereinafter Business Associations’ Stay Application]; States’ Stay
Application, supra note 22, at 1–21; Utilities’ Stay Application, supra note 22, at 11–12;
Groten, supra note 22, at 10122.
24
See, e.g., States’ Stay Application, supra note 22, at 15.
25
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
26
Id. at 842–43.
27
See, e.g., Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 22, at 15–16.
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whereas the EPA argues that the House version is ambiguous, but can
be reasonably interpreted so as not to conflict with the Senate version,
which does not prohibit the CPP.28 Consequently, a reviewing court
will likely be forced to determine whether the House version is
ambiguous under Chevron step one in order to resolve this issue. The
fenceline issue involves the EPA’s interpretation of the terms “best
system of emission reduction” (BSER), which comprises the statutory
basis for calculating the CPP’s emissions standards.29 Opponents
challenge the EPA’s interpretation as being overly expansive, whereas
the EPA argues that outside the fenceline measures are authorized
under the plain meaning of the term “system,” as well as the legislative
history and overall structure of the CAA.30 Resolving this issue will
implicate Chevron to some degree. Though the EPA argues that its
interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of the statute,31 the
Court could very well invoke Chevron step two, as “system” is not
defined within the CAA, and “best system of emission reduction” lacks
a clear meaning.32 Alternatively, recent cases suggest the Court’s
willingness to apply an exception to Chevron deference, known as the
major questions canon, when determining issues of “vast economic
and political significance.”33 Those challenging the CPP argue that the
EPA’s interpretation of BSER is not entitled to deference due to the
economic significance of the agency’s attempt to restructure the
energy sector.34
This Comment begins with a brief overview of the relevant
portions of the CAA, as well as the Chevron doctrine and the major
questions canon in Parts II and III, respectively. Part IV summarizes
the arguments on both sides of these two crucial issues, assesses their
strengths and weaknesses, and concludes that the CPP ought to survive
them. In particular, the arguments in favor of reading § 111(d) to
preclude the CPP are relatively weak, and under Chevron, a court
should defer to the EPA’s interpretation. Furthermore, interpreting §
28

Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64712-15 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Final Rule].
29
42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)1, (d)1 (2012); Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64723.
30
Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64758-62
31
See id. at 64758.
32
See Jody Freeman, Why I Worry About UARG, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 13
(2015); Carlson & Herzog, supra note 16, at 29.
33
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014); See also King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 160 (2000).
34
See Utilities’ Stay Application, supra note 22, at 11; Business Associations’ Stay
Application, supra note 23, at 10–11; Coal Industry Stay Application, supra note 22, at 3;
States’ Stay Application, supra note 22, at 15.
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111(d) to allow regulations beyond the fenceline is reasonable under
Chevron step two. Finally, the major questions canon should not be
applied to invalidate the CPP. The rule lacks a convincing rationale
and the Court has not defined the criteria for administering it.
Moreover, recent cases in which the doctrine was applied are
distinguishable from the context of the CPP.
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
In order to implement the CPP, the EPA relies on its authority
under § 111(d) of the CAA. Section 111 was originally conceived as
part of a “three-legged” approach to regulating air pollutants emitted
from stationary sources.35 Accordingly, §§ 107-110 of the CAA address
“criteria pollutants,” “the presence of which in the ambient air results
from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources,” and which
“may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”36
In addition, § 112 establishes national emissions standards for a list of
designated “hazardous air pollutants” (HAPs) emitted from particular
types of sources.37 In light of these provisions, § 111 was originally
conceived as a gap-filler that would cover emissions of non-criteria,
non-HAP pollutants that the EPA determined caused or contributed
to “air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare.”38 In particular, § 111(b) addresses emissions
from new sources, while § 111(d) covers existing sources.39 Existing
sources within a particular category are subject to § 111(d) only if new
sources of the same category are already regulated under § 111(b).
Section 111(d) authorizes regulations on a state-wide level.40 To
accomplish this, the EPA establishes a “standard of performance for
any existing source for any air pollutant.”41 The Act defines a “standard
of performance” as “a standard for emissions of air pollutants which
reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the
application of the best system of emission reduction which . . . the
Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.”42
Thus, to establish a standard of performance, the EPA identifies the

35

Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64700.
42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)1 (2012).
37
42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012).
38
42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2012); Robert R. Nordhaus & Avi Zevin, Historical
Perpectives on § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 11095, 11097 (2014).
39
§ 7411.
40
§ 7411(d).
41
§ 7411(d)(1).
42
§ 7411(a)(1).
36
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BSER for a given air pollutant and source category and the emission
reduction that would result from the implementation of that system.43
States are then required to develop a plan that would meet or exceed
the emissions reductions achievable under the BSER.44 Under §
111(d), states may choose the method of achieving emissions
reductions, but if a state plan fails to provide for the implementation
or enforcement of standards that meet EPA guidelines, the EPA has
the authority to substitute its own plan.45 Because fossil-fuel fired
power plants are a listed source category and greenhouse gases are not
defined as a criteria or hazardous pollutant,46 the EPA is relying on §
111(d) for authority to implement the CPP, including the methods for
emissions reduction suggested by the three building blocks.
III. CHEVRON
In 1984, the Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. At issue was the EPA’s
interpretation of the term “stationary source” in the context of one of
the CAA’s permitting requirements, which treated all of the pollutionemitting devices within a single industrial facility as though they were
encased in a single “bubble.”47 Meanwhile, the respondents argued
that each individual pollution-emitting source constituted a discrete
stationary source so long as it emitted over 100 tons of a pollutant.48
To resolve this dispute, the majority announced the following rule:
If the intent of Congress is clear. . . the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue . . . the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.49
Applying this framework, the majority noted that because the
relevant provision of the CAA did not contain a definition of stationary
source, the term’s meaning was unclear.50 Next, the majority assessed
the legislative history of the provision and found that it, too, was
43

See § 7411(a)(1), (d)(1); Carbonell & Ceronsky, supra note 1, at 11087–88.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(1), (d)(1).
45
See id. § 7411(d)(2)(A); Carbonell & Ceronsky, supra note 1, at 11087–88.
46
See §§ 7411(d)(1)(A)(i), 7412(b)(1); National Ambient Air Quality Standards, EPA
(2016), https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/naaqs-table.
47
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840
(1984).
48
See id. at 859.
49
Id. at 842–43.
50
See id. at 860.
44
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unhelpful in clarifying the meaning of the term.51 However, the
majority did find that the legislative history clearly established the
policy goals of the statute, and it upheld the EPA’s interpretation
because the agency had reasonably concluded that the plant-wide
definition of stationary source was consistent with the intended
policy.52
Chevron’s two-step framework is now considered “foundational,” as
the “undisputed starting point for any assessment of the allocation of
authority between federal courts and administrative agencies.”53
Chevron’s central holding has been interpreted to mean that when a
legal challenge involves an administrative agency’s interpretation of a
statute, the reviewing court must determine whether Congress has
unambiguously expressed its intent (step one).54 If not, the court must
defer to any interpretation that is reasonable in light of the statute, its
history, and the canons of statutory construction (step two).55 This
approach resulted in a major transfer of interpretive authority to
agencies.56 Prior to Chevron, judicial interpretation was the default
rule.
Deference to administrative agencies required special
justification, and the amount of deference was determined on a sliding
scale.57 Thus, Chevron’s two-step framework was revolutionary—
because once a reviewing court finds an ambiguity, it must
automatically give maximum deference to the agency and accept any
reasonable interpretation.58
The Chevron majority framed this rule in terms of an implicit

51

See id. at 862.
See id. at 863.
53
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006).
54
Chevron’s applicability may be limited according to certain “step zero”
considerations, which are not discussed in this Comment. See id at 207–22.
55
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (internal citations omitted) (“If this choice represents
a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the
agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute
or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have
sanctioned.”). See also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101
YALE L.J. 969, 977 (1992).
56
See Merrill, supra note 55, at 977. The extent to which Chevron shifts the balance
of interpretive authority away from courts is often limited in several ways. First, the
application of step one has been described as “erratic” with some courts finding
ambiguity far less often than others. See Case Comment, “How Clear Is Clear” In
Chevron’s Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1687, 1691–92 (2005). Second, the Supreme
Court has limited the contexts in which Chevron applies at all. See Sunstein, supra note
53. This Comment discusses one of these limiting principles–the major questions
canon.
57
See Merrill, supra note 55, at 977.
58
See id.
52
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congressional delegation of authority to the executive. That is, Chevron
relies on the assumption that by conferring authority to administer a
statute to an agency, Congress implicitly delegates interpretive
authority.59 This rationale relies on a legal fiction, which assumes that
a hypothetical reasonable legislator intended agencies rather than
courts to resolve statutory ambiguities.60 The majority’s opinion in
Chevron suggests two justifications for finding an implicit delegation.
First, the majority notes that “the regulatory scheme is technical and
complex” and suggests that Congress may have wanted agencies “with
great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the
provision” to resolve any ambiguities.61 Second, the majority notes that
agency interpretations involve policy choices, which are more
appropriately left to agencies because they, unlike the judiciary, are
democratically accountable.62
The twin rationales for the Chevron framework inform the manner
in which courts should apply the doctrine at step one. The task of
determining whether a statute is ambiguous requires courts to apply,
explicitly or implicitly, some standard of clarity.63 In finding the
appropriate standard, commentators have suggested that courts
should be guided by the underlying justification for Chevron itself.64
This makes sense, given that step one determines whether or not
deference should apply. If the underlying justifications for deference
are present, then a court should be more willing to find statutory
ambiguity than it otherwise would be. Although courts may apply step
one inconsistently in practice,65 this Comment will assume that political
accountability and agency expertise count in favor of finding
ambiguity for the purposes of its analysis.

59

See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“[S]ometimes the legislative delegation to an
agency . . . is implicit . . . . In such a case, a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.”); Merrill, supra note 55, at 995.
60
See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 200; Abigail R. Moncreiff, Reincarnating the “Major
Questions” Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (Or Why
Massachusetts v. EPA Got it Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 608–09 (2008). This has
been referred to as the “delegation” theory of Chevron, which appears to be the
prevailing theory of the case amongst the Justices on the Supreme Court. See Sunstein,
supra note 53, at 198–99.
61
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
62
See id. at 865–66; see also Sunstein, supra note 53, at 197.
63
See Case Comment, supra note 56, at 1698.
64
See id. at 1701–03.
65
See id. at 1691–92.
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A. Chevron and the Major Questions Exception
The implicit delegation rationale serves as the basis for the major
questions canon, which has been invoked to invalidate agency
interpretations that are analyzed under Chevron. Commentators view
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. as the first mature expression
of the doctrine.66 At issue was the FDA’s interpretation of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to include tobacco products.67
The majority rejected this interpretation, finding that it was
inconsistent with the intent of Congress, as expressed via the FDCA’s
“overall regulatory scheme” and subsequent legislation involving
tobacco.68 More specifically, the majority found that the FDA’s
interpretation was not consistent with the term “safety” as it was used
throughout the FDCA.69 In addition, the majority determined that if
tobacco products were subject to the FDCA, they would have to be
banned according to the terms of the statute.70 Yet, the majority
reasoned, Congress “has foreclosed the removal of tobacco products
from the market,” insofar as it has “directly addressed the problem of
tobacco and health through legislation on six occasions since 1965.”71
The majority interpreted these enactments as a ratification of the
FDA’s previous position that it lacked the jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco,72 and it concluded that Congress clearly intended to preclude
the FDA from regulating tobacco products.73
Brown & Williamson is notable for the manner in which it deploys
Chevron step one. At the outset, the majority indicated that it was
invalidating the FDA’s interpretation because it was inconsistent with
the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”74 This would seem
to be a straightforward application of the first step; yet, towards the end
of the opinion, the majority again addressed Chevron, this time
discussing its applicability in general, noting that “in extraordinary
cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that
Congress has intended . . . an implicit delegation.”75 To support this
proposition the majority cited a passage from an essay authored by

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 240; Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 601.
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000).
See id.
See id. at 160.
See id. at 137.
Id.
See id. at 156.
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161.
Id. at 125–26.
Id. at 159.
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Justice Breyer in 1986, a time when Chevron’s scope remained a topic
of debate.76 In that essay, then-Judge Breyer suggests the following: “A
court may also ask whether the legal question is an important one.
Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major
questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the
course of the statute’s daily administration.”77 On this basis, the
majority concluded: “we are confident that Congress could not have
intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political
significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”78
Since Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court has invoked the
major questions canon on several occasions. Most recently, in King v.
Burwell, the Court denied deference to the IRS’ interpretation of the
Affordable Care Act. That case involved an interpretation governing
tax credits for individuals who purchased health care on a federal
exchange, as opposed to an exchange established by one of the states.79
Rather than apply Chevron, the majority held that because the tax
credits involved “billions of dollars in spending each year” and affected
“the price of health insurance for millions of people,” the interpretive
issue was a “question of deep economic and political significance.”80
Consequently, the majority concluded that it was “especially unlikely
that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has
no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.”81
In another recent case, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (UARG),
the majority stressed that the major questions canon was appropriate
in the context of an expansion of agency authority that would have vast
economic and political significance. In that case, the majority
invalidated an EPA interpretation of the CAA’s permitting
requirements as applied to GHG emissions. The majority was
concerned that forcing stationary sources to acquire permits on the
basis of GHG emissions would result in an absurd expansion of the
number of sources that would be subject to the program.82 Specifically,
it noted that under the EPA’s interpretation, the agency could require
permits for “the construction and modification of tens of thousands,
and the operation of millions, of small sources nationwide.”83

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 199.
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159.
Id. at 160.
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015).
Id. at 2489.
Id.
See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2428 (2014).
Id. at 2444.
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Consequently, citing Brown & Williamson, it concluded that the EPA’s
interpretation was unreasonable within the framework of Chevron step
two because it would result in “an enormous and transformative
expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional
authorization.”84
Taken together, these cases illustrate several important features
of the major questions canon. First, it appears to function as a broad
exception to Chevron. In Brown & Williamson, the majority discussed
the economic and political significance of the FDA’s interpretation
after it had concluded that the statute was unambiguous under Chevron
step one.85 In UARG, the majority invoked the major questions canon
at step two, as a basis for concluding that the EPA’s interpretation was
unreasonable.86 Finally, in King, the majority never embarks on a
Chevron analysis and simply announces that the framework does not
apply.87 Consequently, the doctrine is not confined to any particular
“step,” but operates as a mechanism for denying deference on issues
deemed sufficiently important.
But it is unclear why courts should assume interpretive authority
over major questions. As several commentators have observed, the
major questions canon lacks a persuasive justification in light of the
two widely accepted justifications for Chevron—technical expertise and
political accountability.88 If, as Chevron suggests, courts should defer to
agencies because they possess more technical expertise than judges
and because policy decisions are best determined by politically
accountable branches of government, then Chevron should apply to

84

Id.
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000).
86
See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (“EPA’s interpretation is also
unreasonable because . . . .”).
87
See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89. There is debate as to whether the major
questions canon should be interpreted as a discrete exception to Chevron. Some argue
that Brown & Williamson should be interpreted as a Chevron step one case, with the
implication being that “political and economic significance” is only relevant insofar as
it suggests that Congress’ intent is unambiguous. See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 247.
Others interpret the major questions canon as a broad exception to Chevron. See
Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 603. The difference may be more theoretical than
practical. Under both analyses, an agency will not be entitled to deference when a
reviewing court determines that a dispute involves a “major question,” either because
the statute is unambiguous or because Chevron does not apply. See Case Comment,
supra note 55 (interpreting Brown & Williamson as a step one case and suggesting that
courts adjust the standard of clarity at step one to deny deference to agencies when
addressing a major question). In either case, the same fundamental problem of
administering the doctrine remains, as there does not appear to be a metric for
determining what constitutes a major question.
88
See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 242–44; Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 606–16.
85
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economically and politically significant issues as well. In King, the
majority indicates that it is concerned with technical expertise, and its
rationale for invoking the major questions canon is that the IRS is the
wrong agency for determining health care policy.89 But in UARG, the
majority suggests a different rationale, which is that courts should
assume interpretive authority when an agency attempts to enlarge its
own jurisdiction.90 But conceptualizing the major questions canon in
terms of a rule against agency self-aggrandizement also lacks a
compelling justification in light of Chevron. This is because agency
interpretations that result in broader authority also involve technical
expertise and political accountability. Thus, assuming that an agency’s
rulemaking was motivated purely out of a bad faith desire for increased
power, it would still be subject to political forces that would force it to
develop “compelling technical and political reasons for [its]
decisions.”91
Another problem with the major questions canon is that there is
no criterion for administering the doctrine. In each major questions
case, the Court simply relies on the phrase “economic and political
significance” without explaining where the line is drawn. For instance,
the King majority cites the fact that the ACA tax credits constituted
“billions of dollars in spending” and affected “millions of people.92 But
what if it only involved millions in spending and affected thousands of
people, would the major questions canon still apply? The Court leaves
this question unanswered.93 Moreover, the apparent source of the
doctrine, Justice Breyer’s essay, also fails to address the issue.94 Breyer
himself has indicated that he viewed “majorness” as one of several
factors that would determine how much deference a court would
apply.95

89

See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
91
See Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 614 (arguing against a self-aggrandizing
justification for the major questions canon).
92
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
93
See Sunstein, supra note 53, at 243 (arguing that the major questions doctrine
should not be applied as an exception to Chevron because there is no way to administer
the distinction between interstitial and major questions and because agency expertise
and political accountability are relevant to the resolution of major questions);
Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 621 (noting that the major questions exception lacks “a
workable rationale”).
94
See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 370–71 (1984).
95
Moncrieff, supra note 60, at 611 n.72.
90
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IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES
This Comment addresses two arguments that are likely to figure
prominently in the legal challenge against the CPP. First, a reviewing
court will be forced to answer the threshold question of whether § 112
precludes regulation of existing sources under § 111(d). This will
require judicial review of a longstanding drafting error, which will be
an issue of first impression.96 Second, recent decisions involving EPA
interpretations of the CAA suggest that the “fenceline” issue will play a
major role in a challenge before the Supreme Court, as at least four
Justices have expressed concern over the breadth of EPA’s statutory
authority to regulate air pollutants.97 In addition, the EPA’s asserted
authority to regulate beyond the fenceline constitutes the central
premise of the CPP as well as an unprecedented expansion of
regulatory power with respect to air pollution and GHG’s in particular.
Consequently, the resolution of this issue will likely have a lasting
impact on future EPA action under the CAA.
A. The Drafting Error Argument
In 1990, Congress amended the CAA and passed two different,
potentially conflicting versions of § 111(d).98 Prior to the 1990
amendments, § 111(d)(1) applied to “any air pollutant for which air
quality criteria have not been issued or which is not included on a list
published under section 108(a) or 112(b)(1)(A).”99 Consistent with §
111(d)’s role as a gap-filler for pollutants that were not covered by the
criteria pollutant and HAP programs, this language was interpreted to
exclude three categories of air pollutants: those for which air quality
criteria have not been issued, those listed in § 108(a), and those listed
in § 112(b)(1)(A).100 In amending this provision in 1990, the Senate
merely updated the cross-reference to reflect changes to § 112,
substituting “§ 112” for “§ 112(b)(1)(A).”101 Meanwhile the House
version contains the language that currently appears in the U.S.
Code:102 “for any air pollutant for which air quality criteria have not
been issued or which is not included on a list published under [§
96

See Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11095.
See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); EPA v. EME Homer
City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007).
98
See Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11098.
99
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 111(d)(1)(A), 81 Stat.
485, 1684 (1970).
100
See Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11100.
101
See id. at 11098.
102
The Senate version is included in the Statutes at Large.
97
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108(a)] of this title or emitted from a source category which is regulated under
[§ 112] of this title.”103
Opponents of the CPP argue that the House version precludes
the EPA from regulating CO2 emissions from power plants under §
111(d). On this view, the language of the House version is
unambiguous, and by its plain meaning, § 111(d)(1) explicitly
excludes pollutants regulated under § 108(a) as well as any air
pollutant emitted from a source category regulated under § 112.104
Opponents also argue that this interpretation is consistent with the
1990 amendments, which revised § 112 to authorize regulations
according to source categories rather than pollutants.105 As a result of
this change, opponents contend that § 111(d)(1) was similarly
amended to exclude § 112 source categories rather than pollutants, so
as to avoid subjecting existing sources to simultaneous national and
state-wide standards under §§ 112 and 111(d), respectively.106 Because
§ 112 authorizes the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, which apply to
power plants, this reading of the House version would invalidate the
CPP.107
In addition, proponents of this view argue that Congress never
intended to pass the Senate version of § 111(d). In the absence of any
legislative history clarifying the intended scope of the § 111(d)
exception,108 opponents of the CPP rely on the textual structure of the
1990 amendments. Accordingly, they note that the House version
appears among several substantive changes to the Act, whereas the
Senate version is included among a list of “clerical” changes under the
heading “Conforming Amendments.”109
The Senate Legislative
Drafting Manual stipulates that conforming amendments are
“necessitated by the substantive amendments or provisions of the

103

42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
See Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 22, at 15–18; Final Brief of the States
of West Virginia, Alabama, Alaska, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming as Intervenors in Support of the
Petitioner at 4, 6–12, In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Nos.
14-1112, 14-1151) [hereinafter Murray Energy States’ Brief].
105
See, e.g., Coal Industry Stay Application, supra note 22, at 13–15.
106
See, e.g., id.
107
See Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11098.
108
See id. at 11103 (“[T]here is no obvious congressional purpose undergirding the
dueling amendments. There are no floor statements or committee reports that
directly answer the question of what Congress intended when amending § 111(d) in
the 1990 CAA.”).
109
See Murray Energy States’ Brief, supra note 104, at 7–8; Murray Energy Petitioner’s
Brief, supra note 22, at 30–31.
104
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bill.”110 Thus, the Senate version, which replaces “112(b)(1)(A)” with
“112(b),”111 corresponds with the need to update the cross-reference to
§ 112 in light of substantive amendments made to that section.112 Yet,
the House version also replaces this cross-reference, substituting
“112(b)(1)(A)” with “or emitted from a source category which is
regulated under section 112.”113 In light of this conflict, opponents of
the CPP argue that the Drafters intended to pass the House version
because a conforming amendment would never be intended to qualify
a substantive amendment.114 Consequently, they argue that the Senate
version was included in the final draft of the amendments by mistake
and should not be given effect.115
Alternatively, opponents also argue that even if a court were to
consider the Senate version, it should give effect to both provisions and
interpret them to exclude—in addition to criteria pollutants—both
any HAP emitted from any source and any air pollutant emitted from
a source category regulated under § 112.116 Opponents contend that
principles of statutory construction require a court to give maximum
effect to the language in each provision and that, therefore, this
reading constitutes the only permissible interpretation of both
provisions.117 Moreover, proponents argue that because the 1990
amendments expanded the scope of § 112, this interpretation is
consistent with the overall structure of the Act insofar as it narrows the
gap covered by § 111(d).118
Unsurprisingly, the EPA rejects both of these arguments and takes
110

United States Senate, Office of the Legislative Counsel, Legislative Drafting
Manual § 126(b)(2)(A) (1997).
111
Clean Air Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399
(1990); see Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 22, at 30–31.
112
See Murray Energy States’ Brief, supra note 105, at 9.
113
Clean Air Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 108, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
114
See Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 22, at 33. The entity responsible
for preparing the U.S. Code, the House Office of the Law Revision Counsel, resolved
this conflict by applying the amendments in the order in which they appear. See id. at
30–31 (noting that Congress and the House Office of the Law Revision Counsel have
established a rule whereby an amendment will not be included in the U.S. Code if “a
prior amendment in the same bill removes or alters the text that the subsequent
amendment would amend”). Accordingly, because the cross-reference to § 112 had
already been deleted by operation of the prior amendment containing the House
version, the Senate version “could not be executed” and was not included in the U.S.
Code. See id. (quoting the Office’s amendment note).
115
See Murray Energy States’ Brief, supra note 105, at 9–11.
116
See id. at 14–15.
117
See id. at 13.
118
See Groten, supra note 22, at 10121 (noting that Congress completely rewrote §
112, adding a list of 188 HAPs to regulate).
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the position that § 111(d) authorizes the regulation of CO2 from power
plants. Instead, the agency gives effect to both versions of the 1990
amendments, and construes them as having the same meaning within
the context of the CPP.119 Accordingly, the EPA argues that the Senate
version is clear and unambiguous, and that its plain meaning excludes
regulation of the pollutants listed in § 112.120 With regard to the House
version, the EPA argues that the language is ambiguous, and that in
light of the CAA’s history and structure, the only reasonable
interpretation is that it excludes air pollutants listed in § 112 that are
also emitted from source categories regulated under § 112.121 On this
reading, the § 111(d) exclusion does not preclude the CPP because
CO2 is not a HAP subject to § 112.122
Whereas opponents of the CPP assume that the House version’s
language is clear, the EPA’s position suggests that it should be entitled
to deference under Chevron step two.123 To support this view, the EPA
argues that the House version is susceptible to numerous
interpretations.124 To illustrate, recall that § 111(d)(1) provides as
follows:
The Administrator shall prescribe regulations . . . under
which each State shall submit to the Administrator a plan
which establishes standards of performance for any existing
source for any air pollutant [clause 1] for which air quality
criteria have not been issued or [clause 2] which is not
included on a list published under [§ 108(a)] of this title or
[clause 3] emitted from a source category which is regulated
under [§ 112] of this title.125
Opponents of the CPP read the three clauses as simultaneous
requirements, such that § 111(d) only applies to air pollutants that
meet all three conditions. This reading imputes a conjunctive
relationship between the three clauses, effectively replacing each “or”
with an “and.” Yet, as the EPA and others have noted,126 the disjunctive
“or” that connects each clause supports a literal interpretation that
allows the EPA to regulate any air pollutant when either air quality
criteria have not been established for that pollutant, or the pollutant
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

11105.

See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64715.
See id. at 64712. This interpretation is not in dispute.
See id. at 64714–15.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012).
See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64712.
See id. at 64713.
42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2012) (numbering added).
See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64713; Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at
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is either not listed in § 108(a) or not emitted from a source category
listed in § 112. On this reading, § 111(d) would authorize the EPA to
regulate any air pollutant for which air quality criteria have not been
issued, regardless of whether it is subject to regulation under § 112.127
The plain text of the House version also supports an
interpretation that expressly authorizes the regulation of air pollutants
that are emitted from a source category that is subject to § 112. Unlike
the first two clauses, which are stated in the negative (“for which air
quality criteria have not been issued . . . which is not on a list published
under [§ 108(a)]”), the third clause is stated in the positive.
Opponents of the CPP rely on an interpretation of the House version
that implicitly repeats the negative from clause two, reading clause
three as “which is not emitted from a source category which is regulated
under § 112,” to conclude that § 111(d) prohibits rather than
authorizes the regulation of pollutants emitted from § 112 source
categories. But as the EPA points out, this interpretation relies on a
presumption, not the plain text of the House version.128
Because the plain text of the House version supports multiple
readings, the EPA argues that it is ambiguous.129 Thus, in anticipation
of Chevron step two, the EPA advances an interpretation that does not
preclude the CPP, which the agency argues is reasonable in light of §
111(d)’s purpose as a gap-filler covering non-criteria, non-HAP
pollutants. The EPA’s definition diverges from the plain text of the
House version in the same manner as its opponents’ interpretation,
construing the three clauses as conjunctives, and reading a negative
“which is not” in to the third clause.130 However, unlike its opponents,
the EPA does not read the qualifying clause “emitted from a source
category which is regulated under [§ 112]” as a broad exclusion of
source categories listed under § 112 regardless of the pollutant subject
to regulation under § 111(d).131 Instead, the EPA argues that
“regulated under [§ 112]” only refers to HAP emissions.132 Therefore,

127

See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64713. Because air quality criteria have not been
issued for CO2, this interpretation would not preclude the CPP. See id. Nevertheless,
the EPA rejects this interpretation as unreasonable because it would undermine §
111(d)’s historical purpose as a gap-filler by eliminating the relationship between §
111(d) and § 112 altogether. See id.
128
See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64713. The EPA also rejects this interpretation
as unreasonable because it would allow for the regulation of HAPs that are already
subject to § 112 regulations. See id.
129
Id. at 64712–14.
130
See id. at 64714.
131
See id.
132
See id.
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when “regulated under [§ 112]” modifies “source categories,”133 it
means that source categories listed under § 112 are excluded when the
pollutant subject to § 111(d) regulation is also a HAP listed in § 112.134
In this manner, the EPA reads the House version as a similar, but more
narrow exclusion than the Senate version. Whereas the Senate version
excludes pollutants that are listed under § 112, the EPA argues that the
House version should be read to exclude § 112 pollutants emitted from
§ 112 source categories.135
The EPA argues that this reading is reasonable because it is
consistent with the structure of the Act and Congress’s intent. First,
the EPA notes that because “emitted from a source category which is
regulated under [§ 112]” modifies “any air pollutant,” it makes more
sense to interpret the clause as an exclusion of pollutants rather than
source categories.136 Second, the EPA argues that its interpretation is
consistent with the structure of the CAA because it does not leave a
regulatory gap for harmful pollutants that are not regulated under the
criteria or HAP programs.137 By contrast, the alternative interpretation
adopted by the opponents of the CPP would prevent the EPA from
regulating harmful non-criteria, non-HAP pollutants emitted from a
source category that is subject to regulation under § 112.138 But, the
EPA argues, there is no evidence to suggest that Congress intended to
narrow § 111(d) coverage when it passed the 1990 amendments.139
Finally, because the EPA recognizes both versions of § 111(d), it argues
that its interpretation of the House version is reasonable because it is
consistent with the Senate version.140
B. Resolving the Drafting Error Argument
Ultimately, because the dispute involves an agency’s
interpretation of a statute, the drafting error issue hinges on a court’s
application of Chevron. If a reviewing court determines that Congress
did not intend to pass the Senate amendment to § 111(d), it will still
have to determine whether the House version is ambiguous, as the EPA
argues. Otherwise, a court may determine that it must give effect to
133

42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012).
See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64713–14.
135
See id. at 64714.
136
See id. at 64715.
137
See id.
138
See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition at 26, West
Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (No. 15A773) (noting that § 112 lists 140 source
categories).
139
See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64715.
140
See id.
134
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both versions.141 In this event, opponents of the CPP argue that the
Senate version should be ‘added’ to their interpretation of the House
version to create a broader exclusion that combines the two provisions.
On the other hand, the EPA argues that the two versions are consistent
with one another. Consequently, to address each side’s arguments, a
reviewing court will have to resolve the meaning of the House version
regardless of whether it decides to give effect to the Senate version.
1. The House Amendment is Ambiguous
A reviewing court should find that the House version of § 111(d)
is ambiguous. First, as the EPA points out, the most natural reading of
the text does not make sense in light of the statute’s purpose as a gapfiller. Because the natural reading of the word “or” results in a series
of disjunctive conditions, the text of the House amendment suggests
that § 111(d) applies to any pollutant for which air quality criteria have
not been established or which is either not listed in § 108(a) or not
emitted from a source category listed in § 112. Yet this construction
conflicts with the purpose of the exclusion, as both sides agree that §
111(d) was intended to cover the regulatory gaps between §§ 108 and
112 without overlapping with those programs.142 If “or” is allowed to
have its natural meaning, then the House version of § 111(d) would
allow overlapping regulations of pollutants covered by § 108(a) (if
either air quality criteria have not been established, or if the pollutant
is not emitted by a § 112 source category), as well as pollutants emitted
from a source category listed in § 112 (if either air quality criteria have
not been established, or if the pollutant is not listed in § 108(a)).
In addition to finding textual evidence of ambiguity, a court
should also analyze the step one issue in terms of institutional choice.
In this regard, the court must consider whether it makes sense to
assume that a rational legislator would have intended the EPA to have
interpretive authority over the CAA. Of course, Chevron itself answers
this question to some extent. As the Court recognized in that case, the
EPA should be entitled to deference when interpreting a complex

141

See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014). A majority applied
Chevron to a statute that contained two conflicting provisions, and three Justices
concluded that in cases of direct conflict, Chevron does not apply. Id. To the extent
that a court interprets the House and Senate amendments as being in direct conflict,
Scialabba suggests that Chevron would apply to an interpretation that gives effect to
both. Id. Nevertheless, as the EPA’s argument demonstrates, the two provisions are
not necessarily in conflict, depending on how the House version is interpreted.
142
See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64715; Murray Energy Petitioner’s Brief, supra note
22, at 21–29.
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statute within its area of expertise.143 More specifically, the Court has
already recognized the EPA as an “expert agency” with regard to the
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.144 Moreover, although the
EPA is an independent agency,145 the CPP is clearly an example of
executive branch policymaking, in that it was promulgated at the
president’s request. Thus, the EPA’s attendant interpretations of the
CAA reflect policy choices that were made by a politically accountable
branch of government. On the bases of agency expertise and political
accountability, a reviewing court’s standard of clarity should be
relatively stringent, in favor of deference. Therefore, given the textual
difficulties inherent in the House version of § 111(d), as well as the
rationale for deference under Chevron, a reviewing court should
conclude that § 111(d) is ambiguous and analyze the EPA’s
interpretation under Chevron step two.
Alternatively, it is possible that a reviewing court will apply Chevron
in a manner that recognizes the dueling amendments at the outset,
rather than proceeding to analyze the House amendment for
ambiguity first. In this case, the analysis at step one is more
straightforward: the mere fact that the 1990 amendments included two
potentially conflicting versions of the same statutory text is itself
sufficient evidence that Congress failed to speak clearly on the issue.
Thus, by giving effect to the Senate version, a reviewing court should
recognize that the inconsistencies between the two versions create
ambiguity.
This possibility presupposes a court’s willingness to recognize the
Senate version, something to which the CPP’s opponents strenuously
object.146 But, it is settled law that when the two conflict, the Statutes
at Large take precedence over the U.S. Code.147 Moreover, opponents
of the CPP have no basis for assuming that the Senate did not intend
to pass their version of § 111(d) simply because it inserted the updated
cross-reference as a conforming amendment following the House
version.148 Consequently, there is no reason why a court should ignore
143

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44
(1984).
144
See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 428 (2011).
145
Case Comment, supra note 56, at 1701 (noting Justice Kagan’s position that less
deference should be accorded for independent agencies on the political
accountability justification of the Chevron doctrine).
146
See discussion supra notes 108–15.
147
See United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 98 n.4 (1964) (quoting Stephan v.
United States, 319 U.S. 423, 426 (1943)) (“[T]he Code cannot prevail over the Statutes
at Large when the two are inconsistent.”).
148
See Nordhaus & Zevin, supra note 38, at 11100.
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the Senate version.
2. The EPA’s Interpretation of the House Amendment is
Reasonable
Assuming a reviewing court gets to step two, it should find that
the EPA’s interpretation of the House amendment to § 111(d) is
reasonable. First, the agency’s reading is faithful to the exclusion’s pre1990 purpose. That is, unlike the competing interpretation, which
would create a wholesale exclusion for specific source categories, it
would limit § 111(d)’s applicability to non-criteria and non-HAP
pollutants. Thus, the EPA’s interpretation avoids creating a new
regulatory gap with regard to non-criteria, non-HAP pollutants when
they are emitted from source categories listed under § 112. Second,
this reading reconciles the House and Senate versions and avoids
creating a conflict within the statute. In this regard, the EPA’s
interpretation is consistent with the canons of statutory construction.149
Assuming a reviewing court agrees with this analysis, it will affirm
the statutory predicate for the CAA, allowing the EPA to regulate CO2
emissions from power plants under § 111(d). Nevertheless, having
cleared this threshold issue, the rule faces a second compelling
challenge—this time, against the scope of the EPA’s statutory authority
to regulate CO2 emissions under § 111(d).
C. The Fenceline Issue
In order to implement building blocks two and three and regulate
beyond the fenceline, the EPA relies on an interpretation of “standard
of performance” that encompasses the entire energy grid, rather than
each individual power-generating facility.150 According to § 111(a), a
standard of performance “reflects the degree of emission limitation
achievable through the application of the best system of emission
reduction.”151 Because the Act does not define “system,” the EPA has
adopted an interpretation based on the plain meaning of the term,
defining it as “a set of things or parts forming a complex whole.”152
Accordingly, the EPA defines “system of emission reduction” as “a set
of measures that work together to reduce emissions.”153
149

See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2217 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (noting that the Court has a duty “to fit, if
possible, all parts of a statute into a harmonious whole”).
150
Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64762.
151
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012).
152
Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64762.
153
Id.
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In addition, under § 111(d)(1), a standard of performance
applies for “any existing source.”154 Section 111(a) defines an existing
source as any existing “building, structure, facility, or installation which
emits or may emit any air pollutant.”155 For the purposes of the CPP,
the EPA interprets “source” to include the owners and operators of any
“building, structure, facility, or installation for which a standard of
performance is applicable.”156 Consequently, the EPA interprets a
“system of emission reduction” as a series of measures that power plant
owners and operators may implement to meet the emissions limits set
by the CPP.157
The immediate consequence of the EPA’s interpretation of § 111
is that the CPP’s emissions standards are not limited by what is
achievable through on-site improvements. As a result, the EPA’s
calculation of achievable emissions reductions anticipates measures
outside of the fenceline, such as investments in renewable energy and
natural gas and purchases of emissions credits.158 In fact, the EPA
concedes that no pollution control technique or process can be
installed at an existing coal-fired plant to achieve the CPP’s emissions
standards.159 Thus, the CPP will essentially force a reduction in fossilfuel-fired power and transform the nation’s energy mix, reducing the
amount of coal-fired power from forty-one percent of the nation’s
energy supply to twenty-seven percent by 2030, with natural gas and
renewables making up the difference.160
Opponents of the CPP argue that the EPA lacks the authority to
regulate beyond the fenceline for two reasons. First, they argue that
the language and structure of § 111 unambiguously precludes the
EPA’s interpretation. Second, opponents argue that because of the
scope of the mandated reductions in coal-fired power output, the CPP
invokes a major question of vast “economic and political significance”
without clear authorization from Congress.161
The first argument focuses on the EPA’s conflation of sources
with their owners and operators. Section 111 defines the term “owner
or operator” separately from “existing source” and “stationary

154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

§ 7411(d)(1).
See §§ 7411(a)(3), (6).
Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64762.
See id.
Id. at 64726.
Utilities’ Stay Application, supra note 22, at 6.
See id. at 7.
Business Associations’ Stay Application, supra note 23, at 16–17.
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source.”162 Moreover, § 111(d) explicitly authorizes performance
standards “for any existing source,” making no mention of a source’s
owners or operators.163 The Act further distinguishes between sources
and their owners and operators in § 111(e), which provides that “it
shall be unlawful for any owner or operator of any new source to
operate such source in violation of any standard of performance
applicable to such source.”164 Thus, opponents of the CPP argue that
the EPA’s interpretation conflicts with the unambiguous meaning of
the statute because Congress intended to classify sources and their
owners and operators separately, by providing those terms with distinct
meanings and addressing each separately in various provisions of §
111.165
The second argument against the EPA’s attempts to regulate
beyond the fenceline invokes the “major questions” canon.
Challengers assert that the CPP constitutes a radical and
unprecedented expansion of the EPA’s authority into an area where it
lacks expertise, transforming the agency into an energy regulator
intent on reconfiguring the nation’s energy supply.166 Consequently,
invoking King and UARG, they argue that the CPP involves a major
question of economic and political significance, and that the EPA has
acted without a clear Congressional mandate, thereby overstepping
the bounds of its authority under § 111.167
For its part, the EPA maintains that Congress did speak clearly
when it authorized the agency to determine the “best system of
emission reduction” for existing sources.168 According to the EPA, the
expansive plain meaning of “system” encompasses the beyond-thefenceline measures implicated in building blocks two and three.169
Furthermore, the EPA maintains that its interpretation is reasonable
because on-site improvements would either be too expensive or
ineffective in curbing CO2 emissions.170 Finally, the EPA points out that
power plants already rely on generation-shifting and other off-site
162

See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(5) (2012) (defining “owner or operator” as “any person
who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises a stationary source”).
163
§ 7411(d).
164
§ 7411(e).
165
See, e.g., Business Associations’ Stay Application, supra note 23, at 9–11.
166
See id. at 16–18.
167
See id.
168
See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 138,
at 34.
169
See id. at 35. The EPA adopts the dictionary definition of “system,” as a “set of
connected things or parts forming a complex whole.” Id.
170
See id. at 37–38.
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measures to comply with existing CAA regulations that regulate
beyond the fenceline.171
In addition, the EPA argues that it is reasonable to include owners
and operators within the definition of “source” out of practical
necessity. This is because pollution control strategies must always be
carried out by a plant’s owner or operator, regardless of whether they
occur within the boundaries of the physical plant.172 Thus, the agency
argues, just like any other pollution-control efforts, generation-shifting
measures must be implemented by owners and operators of the
affected source.
D. Resolving the Fenceline Issue
Once again, both of the arguments marshalled by challengers to
the CPP against the EPA’s authority to regulate beyond the fenceline
implicate the Chevron doctrine. The textual argument against
conflating sources with their owners or operators implicitly relies on
Chevron step one, because it asserts that the EPA’s interpretation is
contrary to the unambiguous meaning of § 111. Similarly, by invoking
the major questions canon and the EPA’s lack of expertise in energy
regulation, opponents of the CPP seek to disqualify an interpretation
of § 111 that would allow measures implemented outside of the
physical boundaries of an affected power plant.173 Curiously, unlike its
response to the drafting error argument, the EPA does not explicitly
argue that the relevant provisions of the Act are ambiguous.174 This
suggests that the EPA is staking its claim at Chevron step one and
implicitly asserting that building blocks two and three are consistent
with the unambiguous meaning of the Act. It is possible that a
reviewing court will accept this view and resolve the fenceline issue at
step one; however, the scope of “best system of emission reduction” has
never been analyzed under Chevron.175 It is not inconceivable that a
171

See id. at 40 (referring to the acid rain program implemented as part of the 1990
amendments to the CAA). The acid rain program contemplated generation-shifting
and emissions credits trading. See also Legal Memorandum Accompanying Clean
Power Plan for Certain Issues, 88–91; Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in
Opposition, supra note 138, at 43 (referring to sulfur emissions standards promulgated
under § 111(b), for which the EPA determined that the “best system” would take into
account third-party off-site fuel cleaning).
172
See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 138,
at 44 (internal citations omitted) (arguing that “buildings, structures, facilities, and
installations, obviously are incapable of taking such steps on their own”).
173
See Business Associations’ Stay Application, supra note 23, at 16–17.
174
See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 138,
at 34–38.
175
See Freeman, supra note 32, at 12.
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court will find the term ambiguous and analyze the fenceline issue
under Chevron step two.176 If this were to happen, the EPA might still
lose a legal challenge despite being able to demonstrate the
reasonableness of its interpretations, if challengers can convince the
court that building blocks two and three raise a “major question” of
economic and political significance without clear Congressional
authorization.
1. The Plain Meaning of “Best System of Emission
Reduction” Permits Regulating Beyond the Fenceline
Within the context of § 111, the meaning of “best system” is less
nebulous than it appears on its own. For instance, the Act provides
that the EPA must evaluate the costs, non-air-pollution-related health
and environmental impacts, and energy requirements of any proposed
emissions standard to determine whether it is “best.”177 Moreover, §
111(a)(1) stipulates that the “best system” must be “adequately
demonstrated” and “achievable.”178
Within this framework, emissions reduction strategies such as
generation-shifting and emissions credit trading make sense for a
number of reasons. First, the CPP’s emissions targets meet the
statutory criteria for “best.” Greater reliance on natural gas and
renewables will not have a net negative impact on public health or the
environment.179 In addition, the EPA concluded that limiting the
performance standard to what is achievable through on-site
improvements would either be too costly or ineffective.180 By
regulating beyond the fenceline, the EPA aims to reduce the energy
sector’s CO2 emissions by sixteen percent, at a cost that does not
exceed prior rules promulgated for power plants under the Act.181 In
addition, the EPA determined that there was sufficient unused natural
gas and renewable generation capacity, such that generation-shifting
176

See id. at 13 (noting that a reviewing court might find “best system” ambiguous);
Carlson & Herzog, supra note 16, at 35 (predicting that a reviewing court will analyze
the fenceline issue at step two).
177
See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012) (“[T]aking into account the cost of achieving
such reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy
requirements.”).
178
Id.
179
See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64721 (noting that the D.C. Circuit has
interpreted “best” to mean that a rule must not do more harm than good in terms of
public health and the environment); id. at 64751 (concluding that no combination of
the building blocks will result in negative non-air health and environmental impacts).
180
See id. at 64751.
181
See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 138,
at 39.
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would not negatively impact the energy supply.182 Second, the EPA
found that the displacement of coal and other fossil fuels in favor of
natural gas and renewables was “achievable” in light of the available
capacity and prevailing trend towards greater reliance on natural gas
and renewables within the industry.183 Finally, the EPA concluded that
building blocks two and three are “adequately demonstrated” because
power plants currently have the capacity to invest in alternative fuel
sources in order to reduce emissions,184 if they do not do so already.185
Thus, a court should find that the pollution-reduction measures
anticipated by the three building blocks are authorized under the
plain meaning of “best system of emission reduction,” as that term is
used in § 111.
In addition, the conflation of sources with their owners and
operators does not violate the meaning of § 111. Instead, the EPA has
merely recognized the practical reality that inanimate “stationary
sources”—as that term is defined in § 111(a)—are incapable of actually
implementing any type of pollution control measure themselves,
whether it be inside or outside the fenceline. Thus, although
challengers are correct to note the manner in which the statute
distinguishes “owners and operators” and “source,” their argument is
ultimately specious; any emissions standard promulgated under § 111
necessarily relies on actions taken by source owners and operators for
compliance. This is why § 111(e) holds owners and operators
responsible for implementing the standards formulated under §
111(d).
2. Building Blocks Two and Three Are Reasonable in Light
of Congressional Intent and Past Rulemaking
Assuming that a court finds the phrase “best system of emission
reduction” ambiguous, it should affirm building blocks two and three
because they are consistent with congressional intent and prior
regulations under the Act. When Congress amended the CAA in 1977,

182

See id. at 38.
See id. at 38–39.
184
See Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(defining an “adequately demonstrated system” as one that can “reasonably be
expected to serve the interests of pollution control without becoming exorbitantly
costly in an economic or environmental way”); Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64746–47
(describing how power plant owners can invest in natural gas burning and renewable
sources to offset CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel burning sites).
185
See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 138,
at 40 (noting that some state programs already rely on generation shifting to reduce
CO2 emissions).
183
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it explicitly recognized that regulations promulgated under § 111
would impact the energy sector.186 This trend has continued, as the
1990 amendments added the HAPs provisions to the CAA, imposing
emissions standards on both new and existing electric generating
units.187 Congress therefore anticipated that pollution reduction
would affect energy production when it drafted the CAA.
Moreover, Congress has previously authorized beyond the
fenceline measures within the CAA. To address acid rain, the 1990
amendments established a cap-and-trade program for sulfur dioxide
emissions from fossil fuel-fired sources and encouraged substitution of
renewable sources.188 When it revised § 111(a)(1) in 1977, Congress
specifically provided that the precursor to the phrase “best system of
emission reduction”189 should be broad enough to permit the EPA to
require fuel treatment that was typically conducted offsite by third
parties.190 Although Congress updated § 111(a)(1) in 1990, it
expanded the definition of “standards of performance.”191
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that Congress intends §
111(d) standards of performance to allow beyond the fenceline
measures, including acts by third parties.
Finally, the Supreme Court has also acknowledged the
reasonableness of certain beyond the fenceline measures in the air
pollution context. In E.P.A. v. EME Homer, the Supreme Court recently
affirmed the EPA’s interpretation of the Transport Rule—a provision
of the CAA that regulates “downwind” emissions between states—

186

See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that the
Senate and House Reports indicated that Congress was using “a long-term lens with a
broad focus on . . . environmental and energy effects of different technological systems
when it discussed section 111”). The focus on the energy impacts of pollution control
was also apparent in the 1977 amendments to the criteria pollutant program, which
shares the same federal-state implementation framework as § 111. See 42 U.S.C. §
7409(d)(2) (2012) (providing for the appointment of an “independent scientific
review committee” to, inter alia, advise on the “energy effects which may result from
various strategies for attainment and maintenance of such national ambient air quality
standards”).
187
See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b), (d)(2)-(3) (2012).
188
See 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (2012).
189
The 1977 amendments defined “standard of performance” in terms of a
“technological system of continuous emission reduction.” See Final Rule, supra note 28,
at 64765–66. The pre-1977 language (“best system of emission reduction”) was
restored pursuant to the 1990 amendments. Id.
190
See H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 188 (1977).
191
See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64701–02 (explaining the distinction between
“technological system of continuous emission reduction” and “best system of emission
reduction”).
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which provided for an emissions credit trading system.192 Applying
Chevron, a six-Justice majority found that the CAA’s Transport Rule
failed to specify how the EPA should divide responsibility for
nonattainment of emissions standards in downwind states between
multiple upwind polluters.193 The majority deferred to the EPA’s
solution, which it found efficient and equitable, and therefore
reasonable.194
In light of the history of the CAA and past rulemakings, a
reviewing court should not find the EPA’s interpretation of § 111
unreasonable merely because it calls for outside the fenceline
measures or relies on the actions of third parties. Nevertheless, at this
stage of the analysis, the reasonableness of the EPA’s interpretation of
“best system of emission reduction” remains an open question, as the
major questions canon looms as a general exception to deference that
can be invoked at step one or two.
3. The Fenceline Issue Does Not Raise a Major Question of
Economic and Political Significance
Even if a court decides that it is reasonable to interpret § 111(d)
as authorizing regulations that rely on actions taken outside the
fenceline, it could still invalidate the CPP on the grounds that the
extent of the mandated displacement of fossil fuel-fired power is
sufficient to raise a “major question.” However, the problem with any
analysis of a potential “major question” is that no court has ever
explained where the line is drawn, in terms of economic and political
significance, between so-called “major questions” and reasonable
interpretation. Yet if precedent is any guide, the CPP should not be
considered a major question. In Brown & Williamson, the Court
decided that a ban on all tobacco products was sufficiently “major.”195
The major question in Burwell involved billions of dollars and affected
the health insurance policies of millions of Americans.196 Finally, in
UARG, the Court invoked the doctrine to invalidate an interpretation
that would have brought millions of new sources under the Title V
permitting program, placing a huge administrative burden on both the
EPA and businesses that are not typically considered sources of air
pollution.197 The CPP is clearly distinguishable from each of these
192
193
194
195
196
197

See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1597 n.10 (2014).
See id. at 1604.
See id. at 1607.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000).
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
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situations. First, the Rule predominantly impacts a small sector of the
U.S. economy, the coal industry. Unlike Burwell, other than reducing
air pollution, the CPP will not make a noticeable difference in the lives
of the vast majority of Americans.198 Second, unlike Brown &
Williamson, the regulation does not result in a total ban on any product
or process; it simply incentivizes a reduction in coal power. Third,
building blocks two and three really only apply to fossil-fuel fired power
plants, a substantially smaller number of sources nationwide than was
at issue in UARG.199 Finally, it is likely that the energy sector would have
responded to the CPP by substituting natural gas and renewables for
fossil fuel sources even if those measures had not been suggested in
building blocks two and three. This is because the mandated
reductions in fossil-fuel-fired power are consistent with industry trends
favoring increased reliance on natural gas and renewable energy,200
and because displacement of fossil fuels represents the most costeffective means of achieving reductions in CO2. Thus, it is difficult to
conclude that the CPP represents a major disruption of the energy
sector, as many challengers suggest.
Moreover, to the extent that CPP does meet the criteria for a
“major question,” as the preceding analysis outlines, there is strong
evidence that § 111(d) represents clear Congressional authorization
for the offsite measures contemplated by the CPP. This is because the
history of the Act, the legislative record, past rulemakings, and even
past instances of deference to the EPA all point to the fact that the
CAA, and § 111 in particular, authorizes beyond the fenceline
measures, at least to some degree. In this respect, the situation is the
complete opposite as that of Brown & Williamson, in which Congress
had repeatedly acted under the assumption that the FDA could not
regulate tobacco products.
Challengers’ arguments also fail with regard to the issue of agency
expertise. The Court has repeatedly indicated that it views the EPA as

198

The EPA studied the possible consequences for energy availability, reliability,
and price, and concluded that the CPP would not have a negative effect on consumers.
See Final Rule, supra note 28, at 64663.
199
See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN POWER PLAN FINAL RULE
2–7 (2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cppfinal-rule-ria.pdf (indicating that there are only 1257 coal-fired power plants in service
nationwide).
200
See Memorandum for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, supra note 138,
at 39 (noting that coal-fired electricity fell from fifty percent to thirty-nine percent of
total energy production between 2004 and 2014, while over the same period the
reliance on natural gas and renewables increased from eighteen percent to twentyseven percent and nine percent to fourteen percent, respectively).

CAPOFERRI (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

2/16/2017 9:31 PM

COMMENT

683

an expert agency with regard to the CAA and air pollution.201 Although
opponents of the CPP argue that the EPA is overstepping its authority
and deputizing itself as an energy regulator, they fail to address the fact
that Congress acknowledged the relationship between air pollution
controls and the energy industry when it drafted other provisions of
the CAA. Thus, the argument that the major questions canon should
be invoked to deny deference to the EPA because it lacks sufficient
expertise to administer the CPP is unpersuasive.
V. CONCLUSION
No discussion of the imminent legal challenge to the CPP can
afford to ignore the exigencies of the moment. When the final rule
was published, many thought that the rule’s fate would likely rest in
the hands of Justice Kennedy, as the swing vote in a 5-4 decision.202
Perhaps no one expected that the Court would grant a stay, much less
that Justice Scalia would pass away within weeks of that unprecedented
decision. At the time the stay was granted, headlines suggested that
the CPP was in serious trouble,203 although no one could say exactly
why; the Court’s stay order contained no reasoning, but simply
indicated that the four “liberal” Justices had voted against it. Now,
following Scalia’s demise, there is a chance that the political
obfuscation surrounding the nomination process will have the ironic
effect of ensuring that the Court cannot strike the rule.204 Right now,
litigation is proceeding on an expedited schedule, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit will hear
the case in early June.205 If Republicans prevent an Obama nominee
from reaching the bench, there is a chance that an evenly divided
Supreme Court will decide the challenge. Thus, there is a possibility
that the same Republican obstructionism that bore the rule may
ensure that it survives.
As for the actual legal analysis of the case, this Comment has
201

Chevron itself being an example of the Court’s willingness to defer to the EPA’s
interpretations of the CAA. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 427
(2011) (identifying the EPA as an “expert agency” with regard to the administration
of the CAA).
202
See John Siciliano, Justice Kennedy Will Decide the EPA Climate Plan’s Fate, WASH.
EXAMINER (OCT. 30, 2015, 7:50 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/justicekennedy-will-decide-the-epa-climate-plans-fate/article/2575374.
203
See Coral Davenport, Supreme Court’s Blow to Emissions Efforts May Imperil Paris
Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/
politics/carbon-emissions-paris-climate-accord.html.
204
See Robin Bravender, Scalia’s Death ‘Puts All the Action’ in D.C. Circuit, E&E PUB.
(Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060032665.
205
See id.
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outlined two issues of first impression that constitute the bulk of
challengers’ arguments against the rule. As the preceding analysis
suggests, the EPA can adduce persuasive arguments in its favor.
Accordingly, the CPP should not be precluded by the House version
of § 111(d), regardless of whether a court decides to give effect to the
Senate version. In addition, § 111(d) should be interpreted to allow
generation-shifting as well as other measures taken beyond the
fenceline, as such measures are generally recognized by all three
branches of government as viable, efficient means of reducing air
pollution. Finally, the CPP does not warrant invalidation under the
major questions canon because it is not sufficiently disruptive in light
of precedent, because it is consistent with Congress’ vision of the CAA,
and because the EPA is the expert agency tasked with regulating air
pollution pursuant to the Act. For these reasons, a reviewing court,
namely the D.C. Circuit Court, should uphold the rule.

